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In 1989 New Zealand legislators revised their child welfare legislation, partially
in response to Ma¯ori and Pacific Island critiques that the previous state-centered
regime had failed to take into account their culturally distinctive techniques for being
a family and had failed to support culturally specific practices of decision making
and conflict resolution. Legislators instituted a new and increasingly popular form of
alternative dispute resolution—the family group conference—in an attempt to create
a bureaucratic response to family dysfunction that was capacious enough to allow for
any and every family’s involvement. In the process, however, they continued to under-
stand what counts as a family along nuclear family lines. Against the New Zealand
lawmakers’ assumptions, this article illustrates how, in the context of transnational
migration, Samoan families experience tensions between the nuclear family unit that
lawmakers envision and their lived extended kinship groups. As extended families,
Samoan migrant families’ goal is not to produce socially productive citizens for the
nation-state, but rather to produce a transnational family reputation. Thus, despite the
legislators’ efforts to create culturally sensitive forms for family conflict resolution,
Samoan social workers and community counselors had to translate the legislative
act for Samoan families, negotiating and managing the conflicting presuppositions
of what it means to be a nuclear family embedded in the act and what it means to be
an extended family for Samoans. [family group conference, Samoan migrants, New
Zealand, legislation, family conflict resolution, alternative dispute resolution, ADR]
For a brief period in the 1970s and early 1980s, pioneers of the alternative dispute
resolution (ADR) movement looked to African moots and other examples of prein-
dustrial village mediation to fashion new techniques for resolving conflict in the
West (Christie 1977; Danzig 1973; McGillis and Mullen 1977; Wahrhaftig 1982).
As dispute resolution practitioners turned to nonstate forms to pluralize formal legal
processes, anthropologists and sociologists began to investigate the challenges of
translating cultural practices of dispute resolution into techniques of state admin-
istration and law (see, e.g., Felstiner 1974; Merry 1982). In recent years, the field
of ADR has experienced a new wave of borrowing. The family group conference,
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perceived as emerging in part from Ma¯ori and Pacific Island practices, is circulating
throughout the Anglophone legal world (and elsewhere) as part of the restorative
justice movement (see, e.g., Crampton 2007:1; Merkel-Holdgun 2001:199).
In this article, we explore the initial process of translation that has enabled these
borrowings to occur. In 1989 the New Zealand Parliament enacted the Children,
Young Persons, and Their Families (CYPF) Act,1 which instituted the family group
conference as a means of enlisting families as partners in the management of cases in-
volving child welfare and juvenile crime. The CYPF Act, which was “unprecedented
in the English speaking world” (Maxwell and Morris 2006:241), quickly became a
“‘gold standard’ and ‘best practice model’” as it spread to foreign fora (Vesneski
2009:1). Although the act reflects a self-conscious effort to create a bureaucratic
response to family dysfunction that is capacious enough to allow for any and every
family’s involvement, we illustrate some of the disconnections between the CYPF
family group conference and the experiences of Samoan migrants in New Zealand—
who are some of the culture bearers that CYPF Act’s multicultural practices were
designed to serve (and from whom they were in part putatively borrowed). Using as
an ethnographic resource Gershon’s fieldwork (from 1995 and 1997) with Samoan
social workers and migrants in the aftermath of the act, we suggest that the families
that parliamentarians envisioned when they debated the act can appear quite different
from the actual families in which some Samoan migrants live and, more specifically,
rest on different perceived relations between the family and the nation-state. Thus,
despite the legislators’ efforts to create culturally sensitive forms for family conflict
resolution, Samoan social workers and community counselors had to translate the
act for Samoan families, negotiating and managing the conflicting presuppositions
of what it means to be a nuclear family embedded in the act and what it means to be
an extended family for Samoans.
Governing Through Families: Debates about the Family Group Conference
The CYPF Act emerged during a complex political moment. On the one hand, the
New Zealand Parliament was renegotiating its obligations for the provision of local
welfare and justice in response to neoliberal criticisms of state bureaucracy and
government entitlements (Lupton and Nixon 1999:55). On the other hand, it was
respecting decades of activism to restore indigenous control over the enculturation
of children—activism often framed in the language of “racial (indigenous) social
justice,” sovereignty, and legal pluralism (Daly 2001:61–62 n. 3).2 As a result, efforts
to enhance family decision making in social welfare policy mobilized broad support
“from both the left and the right, from both humanitarians and market reformers”
(Morris et al. 1996:231).
The legislation that resulted from these efforts reflects the parliamentary response
to critical consultations not only with Ma¯ori but also with Pacific people. Indeed,
we focus here on the experiences of Samoan migrants in order to enrich existing
scholarship on the multicultural origins and effects of the CYPF Act, which is often
written from a Ma¯ori perspective. In New Zealand, Ma¯ori are the dominant minority
May 2015 Page 11
group: 14.6 percent of the New Zealand population identify as Ma¯ori, in contrast
to European New Zealanders (67.6 percent) and Pacific peoples (6.9 percent). Of
Pacific Island groups in New Zealand, Samoans are currently the largest; there are
131,103 Samoans in New Zealand, 49.3 percent of the total Pacific people in New
Zealand (New Zealand Department of Statistics 2006). In New Zealand, Ma¯ori and
Pacific peoples are often seen as facing similar economic and social inequalities, a
perspective made bureaucratic in 1968 and for a number of years later, when the
Department of Ma¯ori Affairs accepted responsibility for Pacific Islanders living in
New Zealand, eventually becoming the Department of Ma¯ori and Island Affairs.3
In the mid-1980s, the government attempted to regularize its efforts to consult with
Ma¯ori and Pacific peoples over social legislation and, in our case, legislation to
enhance family control over matters such as child abuse and youth offenders. To
that end, it began to host regular hui and fono (public meetings) to create arenas in
which Ma¯ori and Pacific people could voice their opinions about selected topics. For
example, it “held five Ma¯ori hui and four Pacific Island fono” to generate popular
input about proposed child welfare legislation (NZ Parliamentary Debates, James
Gerard, April 20, 1989).4 The results of these consultations informed a series of
legislative recommendations published in 1988 in a widely cited report, Puao-te-
Ata-tu (Ministerial Advisory Committee 1988). The report observed that “the great
majority of residents of Social Welfare institutions are Ma¯ori and a good number are
of Pacific Island descent,” and it called for, among other things, “preventive measures
aimed at stopping so many young people being put in these institutions in the first
place” (32).
Thus although much of the discussion about cultural difference in New Zealand
that motivated the CYPF Act focused on Ma¯ori rights and perspectives, in prac-
tice, Samoan and other Pacific migrants were actively consulted and envisioned as
beneficiaries of the legislative process. Both Ma¯ori and Pacific peoples, moreover,
expressed critical reservations about the “monocultural nature” of the original Chil-
dren and Young Persons Bill (NZ Parliamentary Debates, Judy Keall, April 20, 1989).
These reservations persuaded the Department of Social Welfare to conclude that any
revised bill:
(a) [M]ust have a cultural perspective which can be demonstrated by its main-
tenance of the status and cultural identity of the tangata whenua [the
people indigenous to or belonging to an area], its sensitivity to and sup-
port of culturally appropriate procedures, and its emphasis away from
intrusive and disempowering interventions.
(b) The Bill must involve parents, family groups, whanau [extended family],
hapu [clans], and iwi [tribe] in developing solutions to problem situations.
[Department of Social Welfare 1987:3; italics and translations added]
Members of Parliament duly heeded the critique that the original bill was too Euro-
centric and biased, and so attempted to craft laws that reflected what they had been
told were Ma¯ori and Pacific Island strategies for resolving family crises. In partic-
ular, the legislators introduced family group conferences (CYPF Act 1989, sections
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20–38), which were to reflect “aspects of indigenous methods of mediation, consen-
sus and reconciliation” (Watt 2003:25), such as the Ma¯ori and Pacific Island practice
of initiating meetings among extended family members in response to family conflict
or to reach family decisions about important matters (Doolan 1988). The conferences
envisioned in the act were to provide an arena where the family members and all
interested parties could gather together to decide upon the best course of action for
the child in question. Often following an opening ceremonial prayer, a social worker
or coordinator would facilitate the sharing of information among state officials and
family members. After the family had an opportunity to deliberate in private, the
family, together with the social worker or coordinator, would formulate a plan to
protect and support the minor in the case of child welfare, or to ensure that a mi-
nor make restitution to a victim and the government in the case of a juvenile crime
(Ryburn 1993:3–4).
The New Zealand Parliament thus institutionalized a process through which the
rules and norms governing reconciliation within the family could explicitly inform
the rules and norms for reconciliation promoted by the state. Indeed, the CYPF
Act encouraged and incorporated a range of culturally diverse family techniques for
addressing child abuse and youth offenders. Rather than impose government solutions
to the problems facing families labeled at risk, it instead invited those families to be
explicitly cultural, or, as one commentator explained, to “draw on their cultural
practices to find solutions, and develop a plan that makes sense to them” (Pennell
2006:265). Government officials, of course, stood ready to intervene when families
appeared to fail to uphold their side of the bargain. The government, however, made
clear that social workers and other professionals should shift roles from decision
makers to facilitators who could empower families to develop their own solutions to
institutionally defined problems (Department of Social Welfare 1989:3).
The years following the act’s implementation witnessed lively and sophisticated de-
bates among child welfare practitioners and scholars. Several supporters of the act
observed that a broad menu of economic and social reforms introduced by the newly
elected Labour government5 made possible, or at least converged with, efforts by
indigenous activists to extract the “unprecedented acknowledgment by [the] govern-
ment that their practices toward children and families were not culturally appropriate”
(Burford and Hudson 2000:xxiii). Thus, for example, Kathleen Daly (2001) explained
that the CYPF Act emerged when a neoliberal turn in New Zealand politics meant
“that services and programmes that might have been supported by the government
in the past are now being returned to communities and volunteers” (61). As a result,
many of the act’s supporters found themselves negotiating ambiguous terrain; they
labored to limit the influence of the government in the lives of its indigenous (and
non-indigenous) citizens “because they believed it was more likely to be effective,
was more just and was simply right” (Hassall 1996:26). Yet they simultaneously cau-
tioned that the language of family responsibility could provide (unwelcome) political
cover for “‘reduced cost to the state’” (19).6
Supporters expressed similar ambivalence about the act’s claims to multiculturalism.
Even if the family group conference “was based on the Ma¯ori practice of resolving
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serious problems in extended family groups” (Hardin et al. 1996:13), observers noted
that the family group conference nonetheless “often failed to respond to the spirit
of Ma¯ori or to enable outcomes to be reached which were in accord with Ma¯ori
philosophies and values” (Maxwell and Morris 1996:95).7 One Ma¯ori researcher, for
example, reported that although “many whanau, offenders, and victims who have
experienced family group conferencing have found the process beneficial and prefer-
able to the previous court-based system” (Love 2000:26), users worry nonetheless
“that the apparent state commitment to a culturally appropriate and empowering pro-
cess . . . may in fact serve only to provide a brown veneer for a white system that
has historically contributed to state run programs of cultural genocide and whanau
dismemberment” (29). Another researcher asserted that despite the widespread claim
“that the family group conferencing legislation was heavily influenced by traditional
Ma¯ori justice practices . . . [e]mpirical research on New Zealand family group con-
ferencing to date . . . fails to confirm that it empowers its indigenous population”
(Tauri 1999:159).
Debates about the family group conference thus assumed a form that has long inspired
critical analysis and reflection within the field of ADR. Could these new dispute res-
olution techniques, modeled on indigenous (or otherwise culturally specific) and
nonstate forms, radically restructure established dominant patterns of state control
and professional expertise to benefit diverse local users? Or are they really just tools
of state coercion “deployed by central governance to buttress a national mandate”
through a cost-effective rhetoric of family responsibility and self-care? (Deukmedjian
2008:135). In the remainder of this article, we offer some insight into these debates,
first, through an analysis of some of the assumptions about the multicultural family
that the act encodes, and, second, through ethnographic accounts of how one of its
groups of intended beneficiaries functions in practice. Again, we focus on Samoan
migrant families precisely because much of the cultural critique of the CYPF Act em-
phasizes Ma¯ori perspectives. We take our cue from Jacques Donzelot’s The Policing
of Families (1979): “The only way to transcend these academic debates,” Donzelot
argued in his Foucauldian analysis of the rise of social work in France, “is to change
questions”:
We must cease asking, What is social work? Is it a blow to the brutality
of centralized judicial sanctions, putting a stop to the latter through local
interventions and the mildness of educative techniques, or is it rather the
unchecked expansion of the apparatus of the state . . . extending its grip
on citizens to include their private lives? Instead, we should question
the social work regarding what it actually does, study the system of its
transformations in relation to the designation of its effective targets.”
[98–99]
Replace the words “social work” with “family group conference,” and readers can
see the impetus for our argument in the following sections.
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Writing Families Into Law: The CYPF Act
The CYPF Act is an intriguing legal document for anyone concerned with the effects
of multicultural legislation. As its revised title—Children, Young Persons, and Their
Families (the latter part being the revised addition)—suggests, the New Zealand
government made seeing like a family an overarching principle for a new form of
dispute resolution endorsed by the state. For example, the act instructs that “wherever
possible, a child’s or young person’s family, whanau, hapu, and iwi, and family
group should participate in the making of decisions affecting the child” (section 5(a))
and that “intervention into family life should be the minimum necessary to ensure
a child’s or young person’s safety and protection” (Section 13(b)(ii)). Only when
interests irreconcilably collide, would the government prioritize the interests of the
child over those of his or her family (sections 5 and 6).
This language represents a compromise brokered through highly contentious debates
between members of the majority Labour coalition, which supported the act, and
members of the opposition’s coalition parties. On the floor of Parliament, Labour
MPs repeatedly invoked the concerns of Ma¯ori and Pacific people who “feared that
the procedures and structures established by the [original] Bill did not take sufficient
account of the place of the child as a member of a family, whanau, hapu, or iwi, and
that they undermined the role of tribal authorities and the responsibilities of families,
whanau, hapu, and iwi” (NZ Parliamentary Debates, Judy Keall, April 20, 1989).
Opposition MPs, for their part, accused the Labour party of “bow[ing] to the cultural
wishes of Ma¯ori and Pacific Islanders to the possible detriment of their children”
(NZ Parliamentary Debates, James Gerard, April 20, 1989). One MP quipped that the
bill offered less protection of children than the legislature of Western Samoa,8 not to
mention that it offended universal principles of international human rights encoded,
for example, in the UN Declaration of the Rights of the Child (NZ Parliamentary
Debates, Warren Kyd, May 2, 1989).
To mediate this dispute—framed in Parliament as a conflict between deference to
multiculturalism, on the one hand, and the protection of children, on the other—
Labour MPs attempted to fashion capacious definitions of the family that could
include multiple kinds of entities capable of caring for children. “Families,” one
Labour MP explained, “are much greater than is recognised by the very narrow
perspective that some Opposition members have of them” (NZ Parliamentary Debates,
Annette King, May 2, 1989). Consider the following exchange between Minister of
Social Welfare Michael Cullen and opposition PM Maurice McTigue:
Michael Cullen: The key issue is quite simple. How does one ensure, as much
as one can, the protection of children from harm—from physical,
emotional, and sexual abuse—without setting up a system in which
those people responsible for the implementation of that system are
virtually encouraged to take children away from their families on
the slightest pretext and not to give families the chance to consider
the issues that confront them? The term “family” has to be widely
defined in the New Zealand context. It cannot be defined purely in
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terms of the traditional nuclear family; it has to include iwi, hapu,
and whanau.
Maurice McTigue: What’s an iwi?
Cullen: The member for Timaru may laugh about what an iwi is. I suggest
that he do some reading very quickly. He will find it very helpful
for him in understanding some of the key issues in New Zealand
politics in society over the next 20 years. The family has to consider
the different cultural patterns within society. That is not sickly white
liberalism; it is simply recognising the differing social patterns in
our society. [NZ Parliamentary Debates, April 20, 1989]
Cullen argued that the act should purposefully describe social unities broadly in
order to respond to a multicultural population: different social groups, he explained
in response to his colleague’s derision, do not hold identical definitions of families.
What is more, he suggested that by understanding the “family” as an indeterminate
term, legislators could enlist local resources beyond the nuclear family (“iwi, hapu,
and whanau”) to care for New Zealand’s children. Like other Labour MPs, Cullen
attempted to use the ambiguities intrinsic in the term “family” as a basis for political
agreement and for fashioning a more flexible, socially responsible, and culturally
responsive law.9
In order to legislate for such diversity, however, supporters of the act nonetheless
needed to describe key characteristics of the family so that it could play the specific
salutary role in promoting child welfare that they envisioned. Supporters of the act
presumed that families exist as reasonably coherent, preexisting, and bounded social
unities (a historical presumption that Donzelot [1979:227–233], among others, argued
is a necessary myth for modern state–family dynamics in which the family provides
the foundational raw material to construct the nation-state). Indeed, as the basis for
crafting explicit state–family partnerships through legislation, parliamentarians could
scarcely do otherwise.
They also presumed that all families function with common aims. While there may
be multiple paths toward the same goal, each cultural family has, as its foundational
purpose, the function of ensuring that the family unit satisfies the needs of each of
its members, and most especially its children. Thus, for example, Labour MP Judy
Keall explained the “family-centred focus” logic of the proposed legislation means
that the government assumes “that, for the most part, the needs of children are best
served within the context of the family, and it is family-shared decision-making that
often provides the best solutions” (NZ Parliamentary Debates, Judy Keall, April 20,
1989). She recommended the revised bill before Parliament, which she argued was
designed “to promote the well-being of families, and to strengthen the ability of
families, whanau, hapu, and iwi to protect young people from harm and to discharge
their responsibilities” (Judy Keall).
Parliamentarians were not the only members of government who saw families as
social units that operate according to these functionalist principles. When Gershon
was discussing “Strengthening Families,” a new government project, with a New
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Zealand public relations officer of a local social welfare office, she asked how the
agency defines families. The officer responded that the definition is as broad as
possible. Gershon then asked what it means to belong to a category so broadly
defined, and the officer explained that families are similar to her family—a team—
with every member contributing his or her fair share. According to her, it is possible
to see all families as paths leading to good citizens.
In other words, in the parliamentary view, families’ central functions are to take
active responsibility for the care of children (and presumably to socialize them into
being productive, contributing members of the nation-state). To that end, families are
expected to self-govern themselves according to the idea that material and emotional
resources should circulate equitably to meet each household member’s basic needs.
The Minister of Social Welfare thus stressed that the family group conference would
primarily address cases that “involve neglect, emotional harm, or deprivation, and
the need for some form of intervention aimed at assisting the upbringing of the child
or children involved” (NZ Parliamentary Debates, Michael Cullen, May 16, 1989).
This perspective, in turn, creates the context for government officials to read certain
dynamics as problems; for example, when people spend limited resources on their
own self-interest, there will be conflict and dysfunction within the family. MP Muriel
Newman laid out this perspective in a speech critiquing the government’s welfare
policy during a discussion of the 1999 amendment to the CYPF Act10
The reality is that dysfunctional families are often very poor managers of
their money, as well as poor managers of much of the rest of their lives.
All too often the welfare money does get spent on alcohol, drugs, and
gambling. . . . If families do not have the right sense of responsibility,
[government assistance] can be used on other things, and in fact all too
often children are the ones who miss out.” [NZ Parliamentary Debates,
Muriel Newman, June 1, 1999]11
For Newman, and others in the New Zealand Parliament, families are supposed to
allocate resources so that the basic needs of the household members (and especially of
children) are always taken care of first; if the family does not, then it is dysfunctional.
Finally, members of Parliament used a parent–child relationship as the model to
describe other relationships between relatives and a child or between larger social
unities (hapu and iwi) and a child. The state, of course, had this relationship as
well—government agencies can act as parents to children when their own parents fail
them. Yet the public debates about multiculturalism made it apparent that government
solutions to family problems would ensure cultural clashes. Hence, the CYPF Act
proposed that the government should, instead, recognize the family “in the most
extended sense of the word” as capable of providing their own culturally appropriate
solutions to family problems (NZ Parliamentary Debates, David Robinson, May 16,
1989). Supporters of the act thus invariably suggested that shifting units of scale—
parents, extended families, and then their communities—could resolve problems
children faced. When parents fail, extended families should step in. How extended
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families are internally organized was, again, left vague, but they were proposed
as solutions to parental or familial failures, and thus expected to act as potential
caregivers, at least implicitly, with authority, agency, and responsibility along the
lines of a parent–child relationship.
In sum, as the legislators debated the CYPF Act, they were conscious of some
of the problems in legislating for cultural families. Supporters attempted to write
legislation with units so vaguely defined that no cultural approach to being a family
was penalized. At the same time, however, they envisioned the family as a coherent
social unit that holds as its primary goal a common project—cultivating children into
productive citizens. Even more, members of Parliament envisioned an aspirational
model of the family—marked by an egalitarian circulation of resources alongside an
emphasis on the parent–child relationship as the primary relationship—and sought
to make extended families and communities visible and stable through this particular
nuclear family lens. From this perspective, cultures are simply the many avenues for
reaching a common goal. As long as families appear to agree with the principal tenet
that they focus on childrearing, the act could accommodate diversity. When family
dysfunction occurs, supporters of the act proposed that the family group conference
could create opportunities for the family to draw on its own cultural practices to
heal itself.
Samoan Families, CYPF Families
In this part, we contrast the assumptions about the family embedded in the CYPF
Act with assumptions that characterize familial relations among Samoan migrants in
New Zealand who were the subjects of Gershon’s ethnographic fieldwork. We do so
in order to explain why, despite the stated intentions of the members of Parliament
who drafted the CYPF Act, Samoan social workers repeatedly suggested to Gershon
that the implied families in the act were quite different from the actual families in
which they and other Samoan migrants lived. In 1997, when Gershon interviewed
Samoan social workers about implementing the CYPF Act, several responded in a
way that puzzled her. The social workers did not talk about translating the act into
Samoan, an activity that the organizations they worked for constantly expected them
to do. Rather, the social workers discussed “raising the level” upon which Samoan
families operated to “the level” of the act. Raising families to the level of an act is a
different process than translation, and a relatively opaque process. Gershon tried to
figure out what exactly had to be done to make the act comprehensible to Samoan
families. Initially, she thought that they were talking about the divide between an
abstract piece of legislation and the nitty-gritty realities of daily family life. When
she asked one man if this is what he meant, he agreed uneasily, and then explained
how the act in its raw form could not be effectively introduced to Samoan families.
He told her that Samoan social workers must take unarticulated aspects of Samoan
family life and transfigure these into explicit topics for conflict resolution within the
parameters established by the act. At the same time, they also discussed shifting the
way that they presented the act to their clients to more easily introduce it into the
Samoan family.
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The social worker’s descriptions thus indicated that the act was not unfolding as the
stories about its multicultural origins predicted. Of course, any attempt to translate
social practices into codified rules of law involves constricting and redefining the
variability of human experience. But what Gershon was hearing from her Samoan
interlocutors was different; they were voicing particular kinds of tensions caused by a
mismatch of cultural expectations, despite the act’s attempts to circumvent precisely
these problems.
In order to make sense of the Samoan social workers’ responses to the CYPF legisla-
tion, it is first necessary to provide some background on Samoans in New Zealand. In
1914 Western Samoa (now independent Samoa) became a colony of New Zealand,
which enabled Samoans to migrate to New Zealand in search of educational and
economic opportunities. Cluny Macpherson (1997) describes three waves of Samoan
migration to New Zealand. According to Macpherson, the pre–World War II wave
consisted of Samoan scholarship students to theological schools and universities.
The second wave, post–WWII, consisted of Samoan migrants who had served in the
colonial bureaucracies in (now independent) Samoa and people from Samoa of mixed
parentage (Samoan–European–New Zealand). The third wave occurred in the early
1960s when Samoan migrants began to take advantage of the postwar demand for
manual labor.
All three waves that Macpherson describes were filled primarily with young adults
establishing themselves in a new country, as well as seeking ways to continue con-
tributing to their families’ fa’alavelave (Samoan ritual exchanges) and contributions
of money, food, and fine mats (densely woven treasured mats) at events such as wed-
dings and funerals. These exchange events would often trigger Samoan family group
meetings (typically members of the extended family and occasionally a sibling’s
affines) to decide how much they would contribute and from whom.12
In American Samoa and independent Samoa, fa’alavelave constituted a public arena
for exploring the boundaries between families, defining family membership, and
revealing the collective strength of a family through its exchanges. Upon migrating to
New Zealand, Samoan migrants re-created communities that often revolved around
newly founded churches that would serve as sites for fa’alavelave. They began to build
exchange networks in New Zealand within the churches and with family members
who had also migrated in order to demonstrate their family’s strength and ability
to accumulate resources. At the same time, however, migrants still felt obligated to
assist their families back home with remittances to meet their familiar obligations
and maintain their family’s status in Samoan villages. Thus, Samoan migrants were
using fa’alavelave to establish their family’s importance in two arenas: the exchanges
taking place among their local church communities and the exchanges taking place
back home.
More than 50 years of migration has brought a stronger emphasis to fa’alavelave
as the central ritual through which Samoan families explore both what it means to
be Samoan and what it means to be a Samoan family. When Gershon discussed
fa’asamoa (literally, the Samoan way) with migrants, initially she had expected
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people would use this term to describe disparate interpretations of Samoan culture.
Instead, whenever she mentioned fa’asamoa, she found herself in a conversation
about fa’alavelave. For the Samoan migrants she spoke to, being Samoan revolved
around their involvement with these ritual exchanges.
For many migrants, parents are the primary vehicle through which they stay connected
to the fa’alavelave. For example, a village council in Samoa will decide that it needs to
build a new church, and ask each family in the village to contribute money toward this
goal. The parents in Samoa will start calling their children in New Zealand, requesting
money for the church. The children will not necessarily feel all that connected to the
village itself—they might not have lived or visited there for 20 years, but because
their parents are asking, they will send money back to Samoa. As people become
second- or third-generation New Zealand citizens, they tend to devote as much (or
even more) resources to New Zealand-based exchange networks. Parents living in
New Zealand, in turn, become the principle overseer of these local exchanges as well
as the principle conduits through which transnational remittances are demanded and
enacted.
In Gershon’s interviews, her interlocutors described two basic patterns for deter-
mining how much to give and from whom. In all cases, the matai—in Samoa the
traditional family chief and in migration often a parent (or a parent’s oldest local
sibling)—learns that a relative will soon have a funeral or wedding, or that a com-
munity needs resources to accomplish a goal, for example to build a new church. In
some instances, the matai decides how much he or she wants the family as a whole
to donate, and then calls each family member and tells them how much to give.13 In
other instances, however, a parent (who is often the matai of the family as well) will
call a family group meeting where members determine how much the parents and
sibling set, as a unit, will contribute to their family branch’s donation.
To the degree that it is possible to generalize, Gershon noticed two themes emerging
from Samoan migrants’ accounts of these family meetings. First, not everyone can
speak freely. Certain people (such as in-laws) do not have the right to speak at all,
and often are not even present. Second, parents make the final decision, determining
both how much money to give and how much each of their children will contribute.
In short, the private family conferencing techniques with which money and fine mats
are gathered for a fa’alavelave are part and parcel of the hierarchical relationships that
shape family dynamics. During the actual exchange, these hierarchical intrafamily
negotiations about the collection of money and other resources are pushed to the
background; the family presents itself as a unified collective in order to reveal inter-
family connections, including both the family’s wealth and the family’s assessment
of its relationship to other families. Thus one significant way that migrants experi-
ence what it means to be part of an extended Samoan family is through the tensions
between delicate (often conflictual) private elicitations and public displays of unity.
After migrating, Samoans often described a new tension emerging between the need to
balance the necessities of maintaining a household with the necessities of contributing
to their family’s fa’alavelave. For example, one schoolteacher told Gershon that she
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was beginning to evaluate her attitude toward fa’alavelave, and that she was no
longer as willing to give automatically whenever her father called with a request.
She recounted how she started to explain to her son that they did not have the money
to spend on new shoes, and then stopped. Her father had asked her two days earlier
for money for a relative’s funeral (whom she did not know), and she had given
unquestioningly. At that moment, she realized that she gave money for fa’alavelave
without reservation, and always cut corners in her own household. She saw her
household’s needs as flexible enough to be deferred and as a lower priority than her
extended family’s needs.
Gershon heard versions of this story many times, in which a person was forced to
juggle the demands of being part of an extended Samoan family with the demands
of maintaining a home. These recurring examples illustrate how Samoans’ extended
family networks do not always recapitulate the aims of the nuclear family but instead
can push against them. From this particular Samoan perspective, the emphasis on the
parent–child relationship is not on how an internally focused family nurtures its own
children into independence. Rather, the emphasis is on how children will contribute
to the family’s sense of responsibility to and connections with other families and
communities. In this sense, the ways in which Samoan people have restructured their
extended family networks for exchanging resources in migration do not reflect the
techniques or priorities that the government agencies imagine for families.
In sum, some of the dilemmas Samoan social workers faced when they told Gershon
about bringing the act and the family onto the same level become apparent when
taking the central role of fa’alavelave into account. The overarching purpose of the act
was to enlist extended families, broadly defined, as culturally appropriate resources
to aid in the care and well-being of New Zealand’s children. The act’s implicit
assumptions about how families operate, however, did not anticipate how extended
Samoan families use group meetings to make the family visible as a collective that
can gather together ample resources for ritual exchanges and yet in which unity is
only periodically desired or achieved. To be sure, Samoans make families visible as
strong and important units through their exchanges, but the family as a unit does not
exist in the way it does for European New Zealanders. For Samoans, the contours
of the family are constantly explored and reconfirmed or renegotiated through ritual
exchanges. During these ritual exchanges, people use kinship relationships to express
different forms of hierarchy. These hierarchies represent declarations of public unity–
but declarations that are often transient and which are achievements in part because
of the suppression of private inequalities and conflicts. When, as is the case with
many extended Samoan migrant families, transnational exchange is viewed as the
primary intentional labor of families, not childrearing, a conflict between diversity
and nationhood emerges. Families no longer share the same project as the nation-state,
and being explicitly cultural is not the road to being a productive citizen.
Other dilemmas Samoan social workers faced when implementing the CYPF Act
reflect the different and culturally specific ways in which information circulates,
both within Samoan families and through outsiders intervening with these families.
Consider the following example. Through the generosity of counselors at a Samoan
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nonprofit organization, Gershon had the opportunity to attend counseling sessions
with Samoan mothers after the family group conferences they attended. The Samoan
nonprofit organization treated these clients at the behest of the local Children, Young
Persons and Their Families Services (CYPFS) agency that sought to ensure culturally
appropriate processes. We summarize the details of one typical case, which captures
the ways in which the intricacies of kinship and the CYPF Act’s expectations about
knowledge circulation did not translate.
In this particular case, the mother had three children, each of whom had been removed
by the CYPFS agency, one by one. The Samoan counselor, Lupe,14 told Gershon that
she did not think that the client was a bad mother, but rather was simply unsophisti-
cated. Lupe said that the mother had taken care of her children’s basic needs, ensuring
that they were clothed and fed. But the mother had no understanding of their emo-
tional needs, and was not careful about whom she let into the house or turned away.
Lupe wished that her client had even one older relative in New Zealand, but that had
not been the pattern of her family’s migration. Although her younger siblings were
included in the CYPFS agency-sponsored interventions as her extended family, they
had no authority to take over some of her parenting responsibilities or to control the
flow of guests into their house.
The mother was in her late twenties, hesitant, soft-spoken, and never initiated a
conversation or line of thought. She only responded to Lupe’s gentle questioning,
and as the questions slowly built one upon the other, a story of communication gaps
began to emerge. The mother wanted her children, who were not living with her, to
visit her over Christmas, but these were not the arrangements that had been made for
her. Her younger sister, in violation of Samoan family hierarchical principles, had
made arrangements with the CYPFS agency’s social worker for the children to visit
two weeks before Christmas. The sister had been given the authority to arrange this
visit because the mother was not allowed to be with her children without relatives
present. As Lupe continued asking about the arrangements, it became apparent to
Gershon and to the mother that Lupe had been negotiating with both the social
worker and the sister for permission for the children to spend Christmas dinner with
their mother. Lupe had been making all sorts of tentative schedules, with everyone’s
knowledge, except for the knowledge of the mother herself. Lupe initially kept her
in the dark about this likely change in plans. It was only in the way that Lupe kept
asking questions that this alternative was gradually revealed to the mother.
Lupe’s interventions after the family group conference point to some of the gaps
and cultural mismatches that Samoan social workers navigate when Samoan fami-
lies must respond to CYPF policy. In the implicit CYPF narrative of how families
function, knowledge plays a particularly revelatory role. For the supporters of the
act, a significant cause of the dysfunction is ignorance—if people knew better, they
would manage their families properly. Proponents of the act thus widely publicized
their stance that given proper resources and information, “a family group will make
safe and appropriate decisions for children” (Department of Social Welfare 1989:3).
Or, as one MP put it: “The fundamental principle is the focus on the supportive
role families can play . . . but they need sensitive information and non-judgmental
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professional support” (NZ Parliamentary Debates, T. W. M. Tirikatene-Sullivan,
May 2, 1989). As a result, the CYPF act casts social workers in the roles of bringing
transformative information: once everyone in the family knows the same things, the
family can start functioning properly. Indeed, social workers and other professionals
are explicitly understood as “information givers,” the nodes through which families
can enter into the government agencies’ flow of resources and knowledge (Lupton
and Nixon 1999:63).
From a CYPF agency perspective, then, the information that formed the basis for
Lupe’s interventions circulated in an unpredictable and nontransparent fashion. The
mother did not know the plans for her children, and had little say in the matter. Lupe
did not assume, as the CYPF act does, that it was—or rather should be—transparent
who knew what and when. Nor did she assume that her role in the aftermath of the
family group conference was to create spaces in which everyone can and is expected to
speak. To the contrary, Lupe worked gently and, at times, furtively to establish flows
of information precisely because, in Samoan families, most, if not all, relationships
are highly charged in terms of knowledge and resource transmission. Lupe was using
the counseling sessions to mediate and manage flows of information that the CYPFS
agency social worker who had contracted her services took for granted.
Alongside this assumption about the salutary power of information is a related aspi-
ration that in family group conferences, people are interacting on an equal playing
field with, at minimum, an equitable opportunity to speak and be heard. CYPF family
group conferences are meant to re-create ritually each person’s commitment to the
family as a functioning system and to provide an arena in which all members, includ-
ing children, are encouraged to articulate his or her own needs that the family will try
to understand and meet. For Gershon’s interlocutors, Samoan family meetings, which
CYPF family group conferences are, in part, supposedly modeled upon, are not sites
for asserting individual needs or for establishing baseline forms of communicative
equality.15 On the contrary, family meetings are contexts in which the hierarchies
of who gets to speak and for whom is challenged and reasserted. The meetings can
provide moments for airing and delaying well-established tensions. Often, these are
situations in which people can negotiate the details of various ongoing conflicts,
even shifting the conflict’s trajectory without resolving it. Gershon’s interlocutors
presumed neither family unity nor individual equality in these settings. The conflict
resolution techniques of the CYPF family group conference, which embed aspirations
for transparency, equality, expression, and choice, can thus conflict with normative
Samoan ideals of how to structure family meetings and ritual exchanges.
Conclusion
To return to Donzelot, what then does the CYPF family group conference actually
do? How does it incorporate or transform the conference’s designated users? In 1989
New Zealand legislators revised their child welfare legislation partially in response
to Ma¯ori and Pacific Island critiques that previous legislation had failed to take into
account their culturally distinctive techniques for being a family. Yet during her
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fieldwork, Gershon repeatedly encountered a conundrum: Why did a legislative act
written to accommodate cultural differences in families require cultural translation
when implemented? Legislators instituted family group conferences in an attempt
to create a bureaucratic response to family dysfunction that was flexible enough to
incorporate any and every family. Yet, in the process, the legislators continued to
understand what counts as a family along particular nuclear family lines. That is,
they envisioned the family as a unit that, when functional, does not conflict with
the aims of society and the nation-state. More specifically, legislators presumed that
within functional family units, resources and information circulate easily and equi-
tably, guided by parents (and other relatives) who channel family members toward
one overarching and shared goal: the overall well-being of children and the family’s
social productivity. Families supposedly become dysfunctional when this circula-
tion of knowledge and resources breaks down, and families putatively can be re-
paired with conscious intervention through communication, information, and dispute
resolution.
Against the New Zealand lawmakers’ assumptions that all families do or should work
in this way (even as they encompass diverse entities and actors), we have suggested
that in the context of transnational migration, Samoan families experience tensions
between the nuclear family unit that lawmakers envision and the extended kinship
groups in which they live. As extended families, Samoan migrant families’ primary
focus as a family (which has an occasional, not a continuously explicit, focus) entails
participating in fa’alavelave. Here their goal is not to produce socially productive
citizens for the nation-state, but rather to produce a transnational family reputation.
Samoan social workers and community counselors thus had to translate the act for
Samoan families, despite legislators’ attempts to write culturally sensitive forms of
family conflict resolution into law. These were not linguistic acts of translation, but
rather efforts to bring into dialogue the act’s presuppositions of what it means to be
a nuclear family with the conflicting Samoan understandings of what it means to be
an extended family.
The family group conference does not always travel as smoothly into different families
as reformers may envision—at times, it incorporates cultural dynamics, and at other
times, it reshapes cultural dynamics to achieve the state’s own ends. Nonetheless,
the technique of conferencing travels widely: to Canada, the United Kingdom, and
elsewhere—and into families perceived as part of minority ethnic groups (Chand and
Thoburn, 2005:175). In New Zealand, it is precisely because Samoan community
workers can adapt the family group conference to Samoan migrant families’ needs
through certain acts of translation that the family group conference can travel as it
does.
Not all legal–bureaucratic forms are as flexible. As Cohen (2006, 2009) has argued
elsewhere, informal and extralegal forms of dispute processing travel widely today
as tools to solve social problems precisely because they are capacious and underde-
termined; as such, they presumably cause less friction when they make contact with
new subjects on the ground. In other words, informal dispute resolution—of which
conferencing is now a firmly institutionalized part—provides infrastructure that does
Page 24 PoLAR: Vol. 38, No. 1
not fully prescribe its uses, and therefore can simultaneously embrace, translate, and
transform culturally specific forms of social organization. Yet, as New Zealand-based
critics of family group conferences remind readers, legal scholars and practitioners
need to remain skeptical of this form’s flexibility. It is enthusiastically welcomed at
a particular historical moment in capitalism, in which neoliberal projects encourage
flexible procedures that allow governments to devolve responsibility to other social
unities, such as families. And so we conclude by asking readers to be mindful of
the burdens and tradeoffs that culturally sensitive forms impose—when cultural cat-
egories are translated into law they are unlikely ever to be capacious enough to travel
without friction.
Notes
1. Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 1989 (N.Z.), available
at http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1989/0024/latest/DLM147088.html
(last accessed January 30, 2015).
2. Ma¯ori activists often framed their demands by insisting that the 1840 Treaty of
Waitangi grants them autonomy over their own communities (see, e.g., Wilcox
et al. 1991:6). The treaty recognizes Ma¯ori as British subjects and was signed
by over five hundred Ma¯ori chiefs and representatives of the British Crown. The
English and Ma¯ori versions of the treaty are different enough to raise questions
about what precisely Ma¯ori signatories were acceding to. Yet, since the 1970s,
there has been widespread acknowledgment that the treaty committed the Crown
to protect Ma¯ori rights and Ma¯ori culture.
3. The Department of Ma¯ori and Pacific Island Affairs split in 1990.
4. All citations to 1989 New Zealand Parliamentary Debates on Children and
Young Persons Bill (subsequently titled Children, Young Persons and Their
Families Bill) are available at http://www.vdig.net/hansard/index.jsp. Last ac-
cessed February 3rd, 2015.
5. Beginning in 1984, the New Zealand Labour government began to introduce
policies based on principles of limited government, fiscal restraint, free trade, and
a deregulated labor market under Rogeronomics (named after Roger Douglas,
the Labour finance minister who spearheaded many of these reforms).
6. Indeed, some scholars who have studied the implementation of family group
conferences observe: “‘New Right accounting practices and strait jacketing of
social work delivery has significantly undermined the empowering and resourc-
ing thrust of the CYPF Act, which was itself the product of a different set of
economic trends’” (Lupton and Nixon 1999:67; internal citations omitted). See
Bargh 2007 for a Ma¯ori critique of neoliberal economic policies.
7. In their later writings, Maxwell and Morris (2006) took pains to clarify that
the New Zealand system represents an attempt to create “a modern system of
justice, which is culturally appropriate” (244), rather than a faithful replication
of indigenous systems of justice.
8. A former New Zealand colony, Western Samoa became independent in 1962. It
changed its name to Samoa in 1997.
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9. For the opposition, this strategy stood not to strengthen, but rather to eviscerate,
the family. As one MP put it, “[T]oday the family is anything; it is bigger than
this and it is bigger than that. [These] comments are indicative of the way the
Government has denigrated the family” (NZ Parliamentary Debates, Graeme
Lee, May 2, 1989).
10. This amendment was designed “to provide more equal treatment between kin
and non-kin-based groups” to act as child guardians. In brief, the 1989 CYPF Act
(section 396) allowed select organizations to act as child guardians. For Pacific
Island people, these organizations included “cultural social service groups that
are established by a cultural group,” but for Ma¯oris, they included only “iwi social
service groups that are established by an iwi.” Under the proposed amended
legislation, a non-kin Ma¯ori cultural organization (non-kin because it “did not
claim to be an iwi in a tribal sense”) could “be appointed by the Family Court as
sole or additional guardians for children and young people” (NZ Parliamentary
Debates, Minister of Social Services, Work and Income, Roger Sowry, June 1,
1999).
11. All citations to 1999 New Zealand Parliamentary Debates on Chil-
dren, Young Persons and Their Families Amendment Bill available at
http://www.vdig.net/hansard/index.jsp. Last accessed on February 3, 2015.
12. For detailed accounts of different kinds of exchange, see Gershon 2012, Schoeffel
1999, Shore 1982, and Yamamato 1997.
13. Occasionally the matai simply tells the family members that a fa’alavelave is
looming, and asks them to “give as much as you can afford.” If the matai cannot
collect a sufficient amount of money, he or she (as most informed Gershon)
supplements the amount with an even larger personal donation, so that the
family is not shamed in the exchange.
14. Every one of Gershon’s fieldwork interlocutors has been given a pseudonym.
15. Albeit on a different continent and in a different context, Gershon’s observations
of training sessions for Samoan family counselors in the United States, in this
case in San Francisco, help to illustrate this point. During one session, the
trainer Angela discussed how to encourage parents to meet their children’s
emotional needs. When Gershon pointed out that not every cultural perspective
encouraged parents to see children as emotionally needy, Angela asked Alofa,
a Samoan trainee, how Samoan parents addressed requests for lunch money or
new sneakers. In response, Alofa tried to explain that children were not supposed
to express these needs openly. Parents were supposed to anticipate the physical
needs of their children. If a child asks a parent for something, the child is
implicitly criticizing the parent for failing in their parental responsibilities. In
general, Alofa said, children are not seen as having needs. Instead, children have
a specific role that has certain duties and obligations. Parents also have specific
roles, which entails fulfilling various responsibilities toward their children. Alofa
explained that this was why most of her job as a community-based worker
was teaching parenting classes—because what might be culturally appropriate
in Samoa was not necessarily appropriate for Samoan families living in the
United States. She described how from a U.S. perspective, Samoan culture
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often encouraged parent–child relationships detrimental to a child’s well-being.
Despite Alofa’s eloquent intervention, Angela was not persuaded. She kept
insisting that to be a parent meant trying to understand, discuss, and respond to
one’s children’s needs (Gershon 2012).
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